Transfer of Military Organizations and Institutions@Transfer of Military Organizations and Institutions@(BE)@freigabe

Introduction – the Military as Organization

The military as the supposedly perfect embodiment of formal hierarchy is viewed as the "paradigmatic model" of organization.¹ This refers to the aspects of "order", "institutional structure" and "social community".² In addition to the "organizational structure" (the units and formations of the military), the "processive organization" (the procedures of military command) is also part of the "institutionalization".³ This trinity⁴ can be encapsulated by the paradoxical statement: The organization (institution) organizes (processive organization) the organization (structural organization).

"Military organization [is] a socio-technological subsystem that enables an associated social system to conduct armed confrontations with other social systems".⁵ It is the "organized application of force between parties that are at war".⁶ It has been stated that a "concept of organization" cannot be "unambiguously defined",⁷ a fact demonstrated by the many concepts. In line with the organizational understanding of military planners, this article places the focus on the "organizational structure" of military units, in contrast to economic literature, which comprehends also the command and control process as being part of "organization". Social sciences literature on organization, by contrast, focuses on general processes of institutionalization. However, and literally presented for muster by the military, there has always been interplay between the formal and informal aspects of organization.⁸ This explains the time-dependent and perspective-dependent "temporality" of the organization.⁹ From its own perspective, the military's "organizedness" has rarely been thematized, but rather taken for granted. This illustrates the extent to which socially (re)produced modes of thinking (re)produce social systems.¹⁰

In Europe, it only became common from the 18th century to refer to the "civilian" and the "military" as opposing concepts.¹¹ The introduction of uniforms from the late-17th century onward and the increasing accommodation of soldiers in barracks in the 19th century illustrate the functional differentiation between the troops and their surroundings. The "bureaucratization of the army" highlighted by Max Weber (1864–1920)[] as an "ideal type" points to organizational processes aimed at creating an "impersonal order" as the "continuous, rule-bound conduct of official business" with the unambiguous assignment of hierarchical and functional responsibilities.¹² The structural formations and rank structures emerged during the early modern period in a Europe-wide process. As militarily organized armed actors of the European kind actively propagated their own organizational standards, it is scarcely possible to discuss this topic from a "non-hegemonic" perspective. What is recognized worldwide under International Law as being military is ultimately based on western organizational concepts. For the purposes of illustration, this article will focus on French and Prussian-German examples. However, this perspective must acknowledge that the modeling effect of these examples played out in the context of Europe-wide transfer processes.

Organization, Nationalization and Institutionalization

The differentiation between the late Middle Ages and the Early Modern period is an "arbitrary differentiation that emerged out of the history of historical studies".¹³ It is possible that the processes of military organization were so conspicuous in the formation of the coercive instruments of territorial states that this prefigurated historiographical periodization. Additionally, pre-formed notional organizational norms may have had a combined effect with descriptive actual norms. The demands that territorial rulers and military commanders made regarding financial resources, military equipment and manpower were often automatically accepted as reflecting reality in older historiography. This assumption has been revised in more recent military historiography.¹⁴ At the same time, military historiography has largely ignored organizational history, and has thus failed to utilize the results of organization research in economics and the social sciences. After all, the coexistence of formalized and non-formalized rule¹⁵ as emphasized in organizational sociology is also characteristic of the regular military.

In his organizational concept, Carl von Clausewitz (1780–1831)[] referred to both elementary tactics ("Elementartaktik") and the "organization and administration of the fighting forces" for the "creation, training and maintenance of all armed forces". Additionally, when he referred to the "annihilation" of the enemy, he meant the destruction of the enemy's military organization. This occurred in almost exemplary fashion as the Grande Armée, which had been reorganized by Napoleon I (1769–1821)[] in 1805, defeated the Prussian army in the twin battles of Jena and Auerstedt on 14 October 1806, thereby plunging Prussia into its "great catastrophe". This collapse was followed by a thorough military reform in Prussia, literally a striking example of the transformation and transfer processes between European armies. According to Clausewitz, the armies were "so similar to each other in weaponry, equipment and drilling that there is no longer a noticeable difference between the best and the worst."¹⁶ He discussed the organizational design of military formations as a balancing act between the coordination of the whole and the autonomy of the component parts:

1. If a whole has too few limbs, it becomes ungainly. 2. If the limbs of the whole are too big, this weakens the power of the supreme command. 3. Each new transfer from one level to a lower one weakens the power of an order […], firstly through the loss inherent in this transfer, and secondly through the longer period that the order requires."¹⁷

Clausewitz already criticised the trend whereby "a commander believes to have a kind of proprietorial right to all parts of his corps".¹⁸ However, the military bureaucracy that counteracted this tendency towards independence seemed over-organized and inflexible to its critics. The polarity of "cold" and "hot organization" describes the two different "aggregate conditions" of the cold "basic formation" of the structural organization and the hot "battle formation". The military thus has a double character: as an ideal type of hierarchical organization, it is carried by functionaries who often refer back to a pre-bureaucratic heritage¹⁹.

The History of Military Organizational Forms: An Overview

Early Modern Period

The statement by Max Weber that premodern army formations were originally based on "clan formations"²⁰ must be expanded with reference to the blurred transitions between kinship bands, conscripts and hired mercenaries.²¹ These forms of recruitment formed the basis for the impersonal military organization in Europe since the beginning of the modern period. Non-European military organizational structures such as those in China, the Mughal Empire, in Persia, in the pre-Columbian empires of the Americas and in the African empires have not been investigated in detail in a comparative perspective even in works that have adopted an avowedly global perspective.²² There have only been occasional references, for example to the influence of Chinese organizational forms on the Mongol army under Genghis Khan (ca. 1160–1227)[]. In the empire of Genghis Khan, the re-ordering of military forces organized on the basis of patrimonial ethnicity into large formations with different branches formed the basis for military expansion.²³ The organization of this army on the basis of groups of ten up to the level of the Tumen, which consisted of 10,000 men, is an organizational heritage which continued in the successor polities which ended up forming the rising Ottoman Empire.

In Europe, large mercenary forces consisting of thousands of combatants had formed from the High Middle Ages. These were referred to as "companies" (compagnie di ventura, grandes compagnies), which were themselves divided into bands that were very varied in size.²⁴ The basis for these armed communities was the hiring contract (Condotta), from which the term Condottiere is derived, referring to the military entrepreneur.²⁵ In most cases, military formations remained largely undifferentiated until the early modern period.²⁶ However, around 1340 the French royal authorities divided their armed retainers into twelve large formations (batailles), which were replaced in the late-14th century by more  permanently established formations (grosses routes), which were each divided into ten units (chambres). The mere mention of these formations demonstrates the intention of the monarch to mobilize and remunerate his forces in a more verifiable way.²⁷

The ordinance companies of the French king Charles V (1338–1380) are often viewed as the beginning of standing armies. Similar formations were also established in Burgundy and Portugal, and standing forces thus existed from the Hundred Years' War at the latest.²⁸ Parallel to this, the institutionalization of military offices occurred, as well as the legal and financial definition of rights and duties, and the formation of a logistical infrastructure. A prime example of this was the "military camp society" ("Feldlagergesellschaft") of the European Mercenaries (e.g. the German "Landsknechte") and subsequently of the Thirty Years' War.²⁹ Around the beginning of the 16th century, geschlossene Gewalthaufen (close-packed armed hosts) similar to the Swiss Reisläufer (mercenaries) were supplemented by the addition of marksmen with hand-firing weapons. In this way, differentiation based on different weapon types began. The term "bataglione" referred at this time to troops in battle formation, similar to the "square" (squadrone) of the cavalry. Based on the model of the Roman legions, each regiment of the imperial and Spanish Habsburg armies nominally consisted of ten companies. In reality, the number varied considerably, though the size of regiments became fixed at between 2,000 and 3,000 men in the case of the infantry, and about 1,000 men in the case of the cavalry. This was how it remained until the 20th century.³⁰ The "interplay between authoritarian power" and the self-organized "willingness to follow" of the soldiers was increasingly replaced by "organization" in accordance with the wishes of warlord.

The Tercio ("a third") battle formations that emerged in the Spanish army during the Eighty Years' War against the Dutch (1568–1648) contained up to 3,000 men, including pikemen, musketeers and arquebusiers, while the so-called Dutch ordinance and subsequently the Swedish ordinance had broader but thinner formations. The increased firepower made a greater level of command necessary. The cavalry divided into heavy, partly-armoured cuirassiers and light cavalry, often of eastern European origin. The dragoons mainly fought on foot, though they moved between their sites of engagement on horseback.³¹ In spite of the large demobilizations at the end of the Thirty Years' War, it is nonetheless possible to speak from an "institutional" perspective of "armies that remained standing", albeit with a wide range of developments.³²

The war-dependent, and risky business of the war entrepreneur created space for a shifting advantage between the warlord, the commander, the officer and soldiers. This "agency problem" discussed in economics literature is at the start of the early-modern military economy.³³ To overcome this problem, a long-term process of "insourcing" combatants, their logistics and their administration occurred. The work of the French intendants and subsequently the "commissars" in Electoral Brandenburg-Prussia were a prime example of this.³⁴

In the Ottoman Empire, standing troop bodies emerged from the 14th century onward. In the first classical period under Mehmed II (1432–1481)[], there was a graded division of the army that was based on proximity to the ruler and level of  peacetime or wartime strength. The standing bodies of troops (Kapıkulu, "slaves of the High Portal") included the elite infantry of the Janissaries as well as the cavalry, artillery and technical troops. In the provinces, there were armies based on feudal vassalage. In the frontier zones of the empire, there were border troops, which could be strengthened with semi-mercenaries or provincial contingents when necessary.³⁵ These border forces were mirrored by the protection of the military border of the Habsburg Empire by South Slav militias.³⁶

The organization of the French army was consolidated into regiments around 1600. In the late-17th century, the prestige of the French army of Louis XIV (1638–1715)[] meant that other European armies sought to copy it. Consequently, the officer ranks of the French army, which have been retained up to the present, became universal. The colonel had the lieutenant-colonel as his second in command, and the captain had the lieutenant as his. Originally, at regiment level and in garrison towns the major served as the officer responsible for issues of daily service. Around 1700, the battalion became a permanent formation level, which was led by a major until the 20th century. Increasingly, the officer posts were awarded by the king instead of by the subordinate military entrepreneurs.³⁷ In spite of the absolutist rhetoric of Louis XIV, however, the French army continued to depend on subcontractors. In the purchasing of posts and in the context of regiment and company economics, elements of military entrepreneurship endured until the end of the ancien régime.³⁸ Staff networks continued to play a role.³⁹

In the battle formation of the Prussian army, the infantry battalion was divided into multiple firing units, which were referred to as "divisions" (i.e. sections). However, they did not correspond to elements of the branch structure, i.e., the companies. Additionally, every infantry regiment had grenadier companies, which formed into grenadier battalions with their counterparts from other regiments during battle.⁴⁰ Similar processes of institutionalization occurred in the cavalry in the 18th century, while the guns of the artillery were only brought together into batteries in due time.

From the End of the Ancien Régime to the Era of Revolutions

In the late-18th century, there was a systematization of the concepts of "tactics" and "strategy".⁴¹ After the Seven Years' War, the Prussian experiences of the war were systematized into a form of linear tactics that exerted a Europe-wide influence, particularly as French military theoreticians discussed the advantages and disadvantages of a "deep" battle formation as opposed to a "thin" one. During the European Enlightenment and under the influence of scientific and technological progress, the systematization of the military accelerated. This was true of both the art of fortification and ballistics, as well as for aspects of tactics, training and (war) history. Thus, the concepts of the French marshal Maurice de Saxe (1696–1750) and subsequently of Jacques-Antoine Hippolyte Comte de Guibert (1743–1790) pointed in the direction of a permanent integration of the three main arms of the army and thus inspired changes towards combined arms tactics that occurred in the armies of the French Revolution and of Napoleon.⁴² A concept of "combined arms" was also advocated by Count Wilhelm von Schaumburg-Lippe (1724–1777), who combined regular infantry, militia, artillery and technical troops both in his small German state and as supreme commander of the Portuguese army. This subsequently influenced the Prussian reformers.⁴³ Re-evaluations of tactics, mobilization and organization were also influenced by the American War of Independence.

Up to the end of the ancien régime, in most cases there were no permanent structural forms on the command level above the regiment. As a result, the drawing up into battle formation and the formation of "corps" required case by case assignment. For tasks of the so-called "small wars" in particular, troop units from different branches were formed into "detachments".⁴⁴ Similarly, military writers such as Guibert and the subsequent reformer of the Prussian army Gerhard von Scharnhorst (1755–1813)[] pointed out that "divisions" had already been deployed as mixed formations in the Seven Years' War in both the French army and the pro-Prussian coalition army of Duke Ferdinand von Braunschweig (1721–1792).⁴⁵ Already in the army of pre-revolutionary France, there had already been detachments, called "divisions", formed from different branches, including artillery, infantry and cavalry.

The Ottoman reforms of Nizam-ı-Cedid (Nizâm-ı Cedîd Ordusu, "new regiment", "new order"), which occurred in parallel to the innovations in the army of revolutionary France, were an example of attempted institutionalization processes based on the European model. Tellingly, the creation of a formation based on the European model in the Ottoman army under Sultan Selim III (1762–1808) in the 1790s was initially carried out in secret for fear of the resistance of conservative elements, particularly the Janissaries. In May 1807, Selim III was deposed and killed, as was his successor in the following year. Consequently, the reform project was continued in a very cautious manner under Mahmud II (1785–1839). Meanwhile, in the autonomous Ottoman province of Egypt the officer Mehmet (Muhamad Ali, 1769–1849) became the local ruler through a bloody struggle against the ruling military elite of the Mamluks, and from 1811 onward he initiated military reforms based on the European example.

During the French Revolution, a modern concept of organization developed.⁴⁶ Initially, however, the revolutionaries propagated the concept of the "nation in arms". Their "citizen soldier" seemed the antithesis of the "mercenary" who had supposedly become detached from the "people" through the preceding process of professionalization. The French volunteer battalions immortalized in the Marseillaise in early 1792, which were viewed as patriotic rather than professional formations, were placed next to the formations of the line army. In the summer of 1793, the revolutionaries proclaimed the total mobilization of the population. In early 1798, a law made all Frenchmen between 20 and 25 subject to military service. The short satirical Wörterbuch der Revolutions-Sprache from 1799 – obviously a piece of counter-revolutionary propaganda – defined "organizing" ("organiser") as all of the methods of the revolutionary armies aimed at "arranging a country in the French way", including "Conscription": "driving men to the army for slaughter like cattle".⁴⁷ As a result of compulsory military service, the French army expanded from around 100,000 men (1789) to 750,000 (1794), and remained over half a million strong from 1807 onward. Between 1800 and 1814, two million conscripts were mobilized in France and an additional million in the new départements of the annexed territories. Due to the lack of professionalism of the volunteer formations, who enjoyed political favour, the revolutionary government ordered their "amalgamation" with the formations of the old army. A line battalion and two volunteer battalions together constituted a half brigade (demi-brigade). This term was employed in order to avoid the term "regiment", which was felt to be reactionary.

Around 1808, the battalions each consisted of four (or even more) fusilier companies and one "heavy" grenadier company. From 1805 onward, a "light" voltigeur company was added. From 1803 onward, the regiments, which were now referred to by this term again, consisted of two or three battalions.⁴⁸ From 1797 onward, infantry divisions consisted of multiple (between six and eleven) infantry battalions, which were organically combined with artillery and in some cases also with cavalry. The French concept of the "ordre mixte" combined linear tactics with deep columns and dispersed "tirailleurs", e.g. skirmishers.⁴⁹ The organic mixture of different arms occurred in the corps created in 1803 under Napoleon I. This large formation of around 25,000 to 30,000 men consisted of two to four infantry divisions, three or four cavalry regiments and two artillery batteries, and additionally sappers, technical troops and a train battalion. Each division could be divided into two or more brigades.⁵⁰ From 1800 onward, the civilian wagon drivers and those in the ambulance service also received the status of soldiers. The states of the Confederation of the Rhine adopted this organizational model.⁵¹

Military reforms based (indirectly) on the French example were particularly effective in recently-subdued Prussia. Even though the military reorganization commission, which had been set up in 1807 under Scharnhorst's leadership, took pragmatic steps to increase military effectiveness, the members of the commission were aware that the military reform went to the foundations of the social and political order. The reorganization involved changes regarding personnel, the legal system, and the appointment and training of officers.⁵² The basic principles of the regimental structure specified in the Prussian military regulations of 1812 remained in force until 1888. Each infantry regiment consisted of two musketeer battalions and a light fusilier battalion. Each battalion consisted of four companies. At regiment level, there were two grenadier companies. The Prussian Truppenbrigade of 1812 consisted of two infantry regiments. After the outbreak of war in March 1813, a line regiment, a reserve regiment and a militia (Landwehr) infantry regiment were combined to make up each brigade, which in turn was combined with a cavalry brigade consisting of two cavalry regiments to form a Prussian army corps. From 1818 onward, these large formations were referred to as divisions, as was usual in France. However, the brigade level, each with two regiments of the arm, was retained. The infantry regiments each had three battalions: two line battalions and a light fusilier battalion, the latter consisting of four companies, each with 125 men.⁵³

From the 18th century onward, organizational concepts based on the European model were exported to non-European theatres of war. As in Europe, these developed out of the existing "markets of violence", with European armed actors also initially entering the service of established powers – for example, the British East India Company entered the service of the Mughal Empire. French and British mercenaries appeared on the markets of violence of southern Asia up to the end of the 18th century. From the late-17th century onward, these mercenaries contributed to the spread of European models of training and organization for Indian soldiers (sepoys). This process intensified during the Seven Years' War, and in the 1780s there were 100,000 men in the service of the British East India Company. Thus, the sepoys were gathered into "hybrid fighting formations" with European tactics, discipline and organization.⁵⁴ Concepts of military institutionalization were the backdrop against which the rebellion against the British East India Company occurred in 1857. The rebelling soldiers were ultimately driven by the fear that the loss of organizational autonomy might also mean a loss of privileges,⁵⁵ just as had occurred with the European military entrepreneurs and soldiers in the preceding two centuries. With the definitive end of the Mughal Empire and the takeover of the British Raj from 1858 onward, a hybrid Indian-British army emerged divided into regiments on the European model.⁵⁶

Conscript Armies from the 19th Century to the World Wars

The implementation of universal military service was a core challenge in the organization of European land forces until the late-20th century. In spite of the unchanged army formations, the controversy regarding the organization of the Prussian militia (Landwehr) escalated into the constitutional conflict of 1862 to 1866. The ostensible question of army organization, which revolved around the allocation of the personnel reserves created by compulsory military service and the professionalism of their officer corps, not only brought about the beginning of Otto von Bismarck's (1815–1898) career as Prussian minister president (and later on, Reichskanzler), but also became bound up with the myth of the Prussian-German empire and of its army as a model for organizational concepts in Germany and abroad.⁵⁷ From that point on, the mobilization, transfer and deployment of mass armies by an effective general staff was the primary focus. In the Prussian-German general staff particularly, an operational mode of thought emerged that defined the image of war well into the 20th century.⁵⁸

The structures that had taken shape in the era of Napoleon continued to define the appearance of the armed forces in Europe and worldwide at the beginning of the 20th century. An overview from 1914 shows that almost identical formation structures existed from Argentina to the United States, from Montenegro to the German Empire.⁵⁹ The German peacetime army in 1914 had 25 army corps with 800,000 men, which grew to 3.8 million men at the outbreak of the First World War. During the further course of the war, its average strength in the field was 6.4 million soldiers.⁶⁰ Above the corps, the level of the "field army" became established.

In the Ottoman Empire also, military reforms were linked to serious confrontations over the re-allocation of political-social power resources. After the reform project of Sultan Mahmud II led to another Janissaries revolt in May 1826, this former elite force was forcibly dissolved. The Tanzimat process (Tanzimat-ı Hayriye, "auspicious re-ordering") decreed by the Sultan in 1839 announced military reforms based on the European model. The resumption of the reform project was initiated by the grand admiral and grand vizier Hüsrev Mehmed Pascha (1769–1855), who implemented a structuring of the Ottoman army in regiments, battalions and companies based on the European example. To this end, French and British officers – and subsequently also Prussian officers – were hired as military advisors. The Prussian model of the Ottoman army in the late-19th century was supported by Germany military attachés up to the First World War.⁶¹ In a similar way, the French and subsequently the Prussian military model influenced the Meiji Restoration that occurred from 1868 onward in Japan.⁶²

The global dominance of European military organization and tactics in the 19th century was particularly apparent in the colonial wars. The capture of Algiers by French troops in the summer of 1830 and the subsequent decades-long fighting resulted in the adaptation of the French Army of Africa. In addition to the Foreign Legion, which had existed since 1831, the disciplinary units and the regular infantry regiments, auxiliary troops organized on tribal lines were also employed, such as the "tirailleurs africains" (referred to as "Turcos" from 1855) and the Zouaves, which were subsequently supplemented with European soldiers. These troops, which had been regularized and "Europeanized" to varying degrees, demonstrate military cultural transfer in both directions.⁶³

The mass mobilization of the European armies during the era of the world wars gave rise to concepts of an "organization society", which envisaged the civilian sphere being organized on military lines. Thus, in 1917 the German philosopher Otto von der Pfordten (1861–1918) saw in "our glorious German army" the model of "an exemplary organization" and viewed "organizing" as "a central concept of this world war".⁶⁴ At the same time, the Russian revolutionaries placed the economy under the paradigm of the war, for example when Leon D. Trotsky (1879–1940)[] equated the "militarization of work" with the "industrialization of the army" in 1920.⁶⁵ The "technocratic utopia"⁶⁶ described in a publication by the American Frederick W. Taylor (1856–1915) in 1913 envisaged "industry run on the basis of scientific management"⁶⁷. It quickly attracted attention in Germany, but also in the young Soviet Union.⁶⁸ In reaction to these concepts, which impinged on the military, the state and the economy, Götz Briefs (1889–1974), who was influenced by Catholic social teaching, warned in 1917 against the individual being taken over by "die herrschende Organisationspsychose".⁶⁹

In view of this thematization of organization from various directions, there have been references to an "organization society" or an "organized society" in the mid-20th century.⁷⁰ Thus, the authoritarian state governments of the interwar years employed militarizing terminology for non-military institutions also.⁷¹ In her work on the Elemente und Ursprünge totaler Herrschaft ("The Origins of Totalitarianism"), which was published shortly after the Second World War, Hannah Arendt (1906–1975) highlighted the aspect of "organizational forms of totalitarian movements" that enable them "organize people in a way that they act in accordance with the rules of this [ideologically formed] fictitious reality".⁷² The militaristic transfer of the military realm to society culminated in the appropriation of a military appearance by the National Socialist party and terror apparatus. This ultimately resulted in the softening of the previously defining organizational boundary between the military (Wehrmacht), the police, the party army (general SS, Totenkopf units and Waffen-SS), and the numerous other uniformed entities. The erosion of boundaries in the understanding of war corresponded with the erosion of boundaries in military organizational thinking, including in the murder and terror measures of the National Socialist regime.⁷³

The unprecedented military build-up of the National Socialist regime meant that the Wehrmacht had a peacetime strength in 1939 of one million men, which increased to a strength of 5.7 million men by the middle of 1940. Of these, 4.4 million were in the army.⁷⁴ In contrast to their French opponents, who had in some respects superior equipment, German operational planning for the French campaign of May/June 1940 concentrated the spearhead of their attack into a "super tank army" ("Super-Panzerarmee") of four corps with seven tank divisions and three motorized infantry divisions. The National Socialist leadership attached its propagandistic image to the campaign, which survives up to the present in the form of the "Blitzkrieg legend" ("Blitzkrieglegende").⁷⁵ In reality, however, 80 percent of the army consisted of non-motorized infantry. Up to the end of 1941, there were 216 divisions and only 24 of them were tank divisions.⁷⁶ The "side army" ("Nebenheer" of the Waffen-SS expanded rapidly from 1943 onward to ultimately reach a strength of 36 divisions with very varied usefulness in battle. From 1942 onward, the Luftwaffe also had a total of 20 air force field divisions. After the failure of this experiment, the Luftwaffe established parachute divisions for the ground war.⁷⁷ Thus, all parts of the Wehrmacht – and ultimately even the navy – competed with the SS for the "Führer's" favour by actions at the front that brought them prestige but also very high casualty rates. Even at the level of the spearheads, the relationships between the supreme command of the Wehrmacht and the general staffs of the army, air force and navy remained problematic throughout the war. Additionally, from 21 July 1944 the reserve army of the Wehrmacht was also under the "Reichsführer-SS". Adolf Hitler (1889–1945) himself was the veritable embodiment of chaotic polycratic rule. As head of government (1933), head of state (1934), supreme commander of the armed forces (1938) and, from December 1941 onward, supreme commander of the army, he undermined from the centre traditional principles of hierarchical and specialist information flow.

In spite of the changing face of war, the basic formational structures of the infantry in the Second World War remained relatively constant internationally. In the case of almost all of the powers, this structure consisted in its core of one artillery and three infantry regiments. By contrast, the motorization and specialization of the armoured formations made tactical independence necessary, as well as the mixing of troop types at an increasingly lower level. In September 1943, a type of US tank division was designed that dispensed with the regiment level. The division now led its battalions directly disciplinarily, while the intermediate level of "combat command" only had tactical control. Also in the German case, the Kampfgruppen, which were initially formed on an ad hoc basis from the tank force and motorized infantry, were combined organically in the structure type Panzerbrigade 44, though this hardly saw any active service before the end of the war.⁷⁸

View from 1945

The formation structures of the European army, which was planned between 1951 and 1955 but ultimately never realized, were based on the US formations. They were realized in slightly modified form in the formations of the Germany army established from 1956 onward in the form of Heeresstruktur 1. However, as early as 1957/58 the concept of an independent army brigade was discussed and implemented, which two years later became the standard for the NATO formations stationed in central Europe. In addition to an artillery battalion, each armoured brigade consisted of one motorized infantry battalion and two tank battalions; in the motorized infantry brigades the ratio was reversed.⁷⁹ In spite of numerous changes in army structures, the basic elements of these structures survived into the 21st century.⁸⁰

In the era of the Cold War, the direction of flow of transfer processes was reversed – at least in the "western world". While previously military organizational models were considered to be a model for civilian society, the management concepts of civilian society now increasingly entered into the armies. In spite of this trend, numerous organizational and management concepts that were either directly military in origin⁸¹ or were defined by the confrontation of the Cold War influenced economic and societal organizational concepts.⁸² The trend towards increasing technologization and differentiation was most pronounced in the air forces. While the German air force had already been an independent branch of the armed forces in 1935, the U.S. Air (Army) Force only became its own branch of the armed forces in September 1947. In view of the importance of nuclear weapons, western air forces were closely integrated into the process of (nuclear) strike planning at NATO level, while in parallel the "national" military service formations remained in existence in wings (at regiment level) and divisions. The technological development of weapons systems, communications and command technology, and the possibility of a more flexible allocation of forces in task forces also played a considerably greater role in naval forces than in land forces. In NATO as in the forces of the Warsaw Pact, land forces remained nationally homogeneous up to the level of the corps (which was referred to as an "army" in the eastern alliance).

Boundaries of the Military Sphere? Irregularity and Interconnection

The recognition of the forms and norms of the military organization as "regular" or "irregular" ultimately refers to the European, state model. Interestingly, historical research with a focus on "interconnection"⁸³ has thus far paid little attention to military history.⁸⁴ Reciprocal transfer processes between "regular" and "irregular" military forces occurred for example at the military borders of the Ottoman and Habsburg empires and in the "wild field" (dikoie polie in Russian) in present-day Ukraine, from where the tactics of the so-called "little war" (or "small wars", French: "petite guerre", German: "kleiner Krieg") were effectively imported into central Europe in the 18th century. The question of how to define this type of conflict, which was already discussed by contemporaries, revolved on the one hand around cultural stereotypes, and on the other hand around the difficulty of encapsulating this tactic with reference to "western European" standards.⁸⁵

From the winter of 1808/1809 onward, the Spanish guerrilla was the archetypal example of irregular combatants. The term "little war" ("guerrilla" in Spanish) – borrowed from military language – was adopted by irregular fighters in the Spanish struggle for independence against Napoleon in order to depict themselves as legitimate combatants.⁸⁶ After the regular prosecution of the war by the Spanish "patriots" had failed in an early phase of the war, and after the violence in a subsequent phase had often escalated into anarchical guerrilla activities, in 1811/12 an organizational "militarization" of this tactic occurred.⁸⁷ Half a century later, Karl Marx (1818–1883)[] bemoaned this interaction between irregularity and regularization. From his perspective, the guerrilla formations resulted "in loose corps that were always on the brink of becoming bandits or of descending to the level of standing regiments."⁸⁸ While factually accurate, this statement also contains the myth of the people's war, which was critical of the trend of European military organization.⁸⁹

Transfer processes of military organizational thought also occurred in the other direction – in some cases with catastrophic consequences. While "annihilation" referred to the destruction of the organized fighting capacity of the enemy, in the 20th century this military term – notwithstanding the already bloody logic of war – was modified into the political concept of the prosecution of war without limits, which played a role in particular in the colonial conflicts and decolonization conflicts, as well as in the struggle between partisan movements and the armed forces of National Socialist Germany.⁹⁰ The fact that the topic of "irregular" war was for a long time outside of the purview of military history also explains why it was possible for a long time to repress and not talk about the scale of the violence in the war of racial-ideological annihilation initiated by Germany. The full extent of organized violence against actors who were denied the right to fight has only been demonstrated in the many relevant publications from the turn of the 21st century. The German forces in particular intentionally – to an extent at least – conducted their so-called "fight against bandits" as an extension of genocide.⁹¹ By contrast, the myth of the people's war that surrounded the resistance movements during the world wars and the decolonisation conflicts emphasized the supposed spontaneity and the ideological dimension, thereby pushing the forms of (para-)military organization into the background.⁹²

Historical parallels suggest that novel forms of the organizational arrangement of personnel, equipment, and the communications control that these required have often been developed on an ad hoc basis and particularly in response to an "irregular" opponent. These "irregular" organizational forms were often transferred to military formations in peacetime and "regularized". Such regular cycles of regularity, irregularity and subsequent "re-regularization" demonstrate the interplay between the structural and processive organizations as the continuous newly-organized institutionalization of combatants.

Outlook

The organizational problem has arisen anew with the military deployments of the international community in the so-called "new wars". Critical observers speak of an "institutional crisis" of the military.⁹³ The processes of military reorganization referred to around the turn of the millennium as a "transformation" emphasized the importance of modular "forces" capable of "networked" deployment. They are often deployed at the verges between war, counterinsurgency and police missions. These "deployment contingents", which are constituted depending on the specific situation and task, are often deployed outside of the military formations above company level during foreign missions, usually with units and formations of different branches and arms – often multinational in composition – mixed at ever lower levels. Thus, it would appear that the formation level of the division has largely lost its role as the primary military-political unit, which it had held since the Napoleonic period.⁹⁴

Phillip Martin Rink

Appendix

Sources

Briefs, Götz: Ueber das Organisationsproblem, Berlin 1918.

Clausewitz, Carl von: Vom Kriege, edited and introduced by Werner Hahlweg, 18th edition, Bonn 1973. URL: http://data.onb.ac.at/rep/1050D905 [2020-06-25]

Guibert, Jacques-Antoine Hippolyte Comte de: Essai Général de Tactique, précédé d'un dis­cours de l´état actuel de la Politique et de la science militaire en Europe, vol. 1–2, London 1772. URL: https://gallica.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/bpt6k5408326q [2020-06-25]

Marx, Karl: Das revolutionäre Spanien, in: Institut für Marxismus-Leninismus beim ZK der SED (ed.): Karl Marx. Friedrich Engels. Werke, vol. 10, Berlin-Ost 1961, pp. 431–485. URL: https://marxwirklichstudieren.files.wordpress.com/2012/11/mew_band10.pdf [2020-06-25]

Pfordten, Otto Frhr. v.d.: Organisation: Ihr Wesen und ihre politische Bedeutung, Heidelberg 1917. URL: http://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:zbw-retromon-21717 [2020-06-25]

Sachsen, Moritz von: Mes Rêveries: Augmenté d'une histoire abrégé de sa vie, & de différentes pièces qui y ont rapport, par Monsieur l´Abée Pérau, Amsterdam et al. 1757. URL: https://gallica.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/bpt6k865593 [2020-06-25]

Scharnhorst, Gerhard von: Beweis, daß die im Revolutionskriege bei den französischen Armeen ausgeführte Abtheilung einer Armee in Divisionen von allen Waffen, schon im siebenjährigen Kriege in der Armee des Herzogs Ferdinand Statt gefunden habe, in: Denkwürdigkeiten der Militärischen Gesellschaft zu Berlin, vol. 2, Berlin 1803, reprint Osnabrück 1985, S.91–96. URL: http://mdz-nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:bvb:12-bsb10595322-8 [2020-06-25]

Taylor, Frederick Winslow: Die Grundsätze wissenschaftlicher Betriebsführung, Munich et al. 1913. URL: https://doi.org/10.1515/9783486747430 [2020-06-25]

Trotzki, Leo: Zur Organisation der Roten Armee: Rede auf dem IX. Kongress der Kommunistischen Partei Russlands, Moscow, April 1920. URL: https://www.marxists.org/deutsch/archiv/trotzki/1920/04/orgrotarmee.htm [2019-11-14]

Literature

[Anonymous]: Die Armee des Königreichs Westfalen in den Jahren 1808 bis 1813. Vortrag, gehalten in Cassel 1866, Beiheft zum Militärwochenblatt 1887. URL: https://fuldig.hs-fulda.de/viewer/resolver?urn=urn:nbn:de:hebis:66:fuldig-4173139 [2020-06-25]

[Anonymous]: Wörterbuch der Revolutions-Sprache, Paris 1799. URL: https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:bvb:19-epub-14172-0 [2020-06-25]

Aksan, Virginia H.: Ottoman Wars 1700–1870: An Empire Besieged, Harlow 2007.

Arendt, Hannah: Elemente und Ursprünge totaler Herrschaft, 20th edition, Munich et al. 2017.

Baberowski, Jörg: Verbrannte Erde: Stalins Herrschaft der Gewalt, Munich 2012. URL: https://doi.org/10.17104/9783406709623 [2020-06-25]

Baumann, Reinhard: Landsknechte: Ihre Geschichte und Kultur vom späten Mittelalter bis zum Dreißigjährigen Krieg, Munich 1994.

Baumann, Reinhard: Die deutschen Condottieri: Kriegsunternehmertum zwischen eigenständigem Handeln und staatlicher Bindung im 16. Jahrhundert, in: Stig Förster (ed.): Die Rückkehr der Condottieri? Krieg und Militär zwischen staatlichem Monopol und Privatisierung: von der Antike bis zur Gegenwart, Paderborn et al. 2010, pp. 111–125.

Benecke, Werner: Militär, Reform und Gesellschaft im Zarenreich: Die Wehrpflicht in Russland 1874–1914, Paderborn et al. 2006 (Krieg in der Geschichte 25). URL: http://mdz-nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:bvb:12-bsb00052248-3 [2020-06-25]

Black, Jeremy: Beyond the Military Revolution: War in the Seventeenth-Century World, Houndmills, Basingstoke 2011.

Black, Jeremy: War in the World: A Comparative History, 1450–1600, Houndmills, Basingstoke 2011.

Bonazzi, Giuseppe: Geschichte des organischen Denkens, 2nd edition, Wiesbaden 2014. URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-02506-9 [2020-06-25]

Brakel, Alexander: Unter Rotem Stern und Hakenkreuz: Baranowicze 1939 bis 1944: Das westliche Weißrussland unter sowjetischer und deutscher Besatzung, Paderborn et al. 2009.

Burkhardt, Johannes: Der Dreißigjährige Krieg, Frankfurt-on-Main 1992.

Burkhardt, Johannes: Der Krieg der Kriege: Eine neue Geschichte des Dreißigjährigen Krieges, Stuttgart 2018.

Chiari, Bernhard et al. (eds.): Die polnische Heimatarmee: Geschichte und Mythos der Armia Krajowa seit dem Zweiten Weltkrieg, Munich 2003 (Beiträge zur Militärgeschichte 57). URL: https://www.degruyter.com/view/title/315855 [2020-06-25]

Contamine, Philippe et al. (eds.): Histoire militaire de la France, vol. 1: Des origines à 1715, 2nd edition, Paris 1997.

Conze, Werner / Geyer, Michael / Stumpf, Reinhard: Art. "Militarismus", in: Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe 4 (1978), pp. 1–47.

Corvisier, André: Armées et sociétés en Europe de 1494 à 1789, Paris 1976.

Delbrück, Hans: Geschichte der Kriegskunst im Rahmen der politischen Geschichte: Hamburg 2003, vol. 3: Das Mittelalter. URL: https://doi.org/10.1515/9783111448886 [2020-06-25]

Delbrück, Hans: Geschichte der Kriegskunst im Rahmen der politischen Geschichte, Hamburg 2003, vol. 4: Vom Kriegswesen der Renaissance bis Napoleon.

Delmas, Jean (ed.): Histoire militaire de la France, 2nd edition, Paris 1997, vol. 2: De 1715 à 1871.

Ebers, Mark / Gotsch, Wilfried: Institutionenökonomische Theorien der Organisation, in: Alfred Kieser (ed.): Organisationstheorien, Stuttgart 1999, pp. 199–251.

Echternkamp, Jörg / Martens, Stefan: Militärgeschichte als Vergleichs- und Verflechtungsgeschichte, in: Jörg Echternkamp et al. (eds.): Militär in Deutschland und Frankreich 1870−2010: Vergleich, Verflechtung und Wahrnehmung zwischen Konflikt und Kooperation, Paderborn 2012, pp. 1–21.

Echternkamp, Jörg et al. (eds.): Perspektiven der Militärgeschichte: Raum, Gewalt und Repräsentation in historischer Forschung und Bildung, Munich 2010.

Ehrhart, Hans-Georg (ed.): Krieg im 21. Jahrhundert: Konzepte, Akteure, Herausforderungen, Baden-Baden 2017. URL: https://doi.org/10.5771/9783845284231 [2020-06-25]

Elbe, Martin / Peters, Sibylle: Die temporäre Organisation: Grundlagen der Kooperation, Gestaltung und Beratung, Wiesbaden 2016. URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-49401-1 [2020-06-25]

Elbe, Martin / Richter, Gregor: Militär: Institution und Organisation, in: Nina Leonhard et al. (eds.): Militärsoziologie – Eine Einführung, Wiesbaden 2005, pp. 136–153. URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-531-93456-3 [2020-06-25]

Epkenhans, Michael et al. (eds.): Das Militär und der Aufbruch in die Moderne 1860–1890, Munich 2003 (Beiträge zur Militärgeschichte 60). URL: https://doi.org/10.1524/9783486596267 [2020-06-25]

Foerster, Roland G.: Die Wehrpflicht: Entstehung, Erscheinungsform und politisch-militärische Wirkung, Munich 1994 (Beiträge zur Militärgeschichte 43). URL: https://www.degruyter.com/view/title/312942 [2020-06-25]

Förster, Stig: Die Militarisierung der Steppe: Tschingis Khan (1162–1227), in: Stig Förster et al. (eds.): Kriegsherren der Weltgeschichte: 22 historische Portraits, Munich 2006.

Förster, Stig et al. (eds.): Die Rückkehr der Condottieri? Krieg und Militär zwischen staatlichem Monopol und Privatisierung: Von der Antike bis zur Gegenwart, Paderborn et al. 2010.

Fraser, Ronald: Napoleon's Cursed War: Spanish Popular Resistance in the Peninsular War, 1808–1814, London et al. 2008.

Frese, Erich: Grundlagen der Organisation: Konzept – Prinzipien – Strukturen, 8th edition, Wiesbaden 2000. URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-663-01527-7 [2020-06-25]

Frieser, Karl-Heinz: Blitzkrieg-Legende: Der Westfeldzug 1940, Munich 1995.

Füssel, Marian: Händler, Söldner und Sepoys: Transkulturelle Kampfverbände auf den südasiatischen Schauplätzen des Siebenjährigen Krieges, in: Tanja Bührer et al. (eds.): Imperialkriege von 1500 bis heute: Strukturen – Akteure – Lernprozesse, Munich 2011, pp. 307–324. URL: https://doi.org/10.30965/9783657773374 [2020-06-25]

Gill, John G.: 1809: Thunder on the Danube: Napoleon's Defeat of the Habsburgs, London 2008.

Greenfield, Kent Roberts / Palmer, Robert R. / Wiley, Bell I.: The Organization of Ground Combat Troops, Washington DC 1947 (United States Army in World War II: The Army Ground Forces 1), pp. 261–382. URL: https://history.army.mil/html/books/002/2-1/CMH_Pub_2-1.pdf [2019-11-14]

Greiner, Bernd et al. (eds.): Macht und Geist im Kalten Krieg, Hamburg 2011 (Studien zum Kalten Krieg 5).

Groß, Gerhard P.: Mythos und Wirklichkeit: Geschichte des operativen Denkens im deutschen Heer von Moltke d.Ä. bis Heusinger, Paderborn et al. 2012 (Zeitalter der Weltkriege 9).

Grunwald, Wolfgang / Bernthal, Wilmar F.: Controversy in German Management: The Harzburg Model Experience, in: Academy of Management Review 8,2 (1983), pp. 233–241. URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/i211464 [2020-06-25]

Güth, Rolf et al.: Die Organisation der Kriegsmarine bis 1939, Munich 1983 (Deutsche Militärgeschichte in sechs Bänden 1648–1939 4/7), pp. 401–499.

Haffner, Sebastian: Der neue Krieg: Einleitender Essay zu Mao Tse-tung: Theorie des Guerillakrieges oder Strategie der Dritten Welt, Reinbek 1966.

Hagen, Ulrich vom / Tomforde, Maren: Militärische Organisationskultur, in: Nina Leonhard et al. (eds.): Militärsoziologie – Eine Einführung, Wiesbaden 2005, pp. 176–197. URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-531-93456-3 [2020-06-25]

Hammerich, Helmut R. et al.: Das Heer 1950 bis 1970: Konzeption, Organisation, Aufstellung, Munich 2006 (Sicherheitspolitik und Streitkräfte der Bundesrepublik Deutschland 3). URL: https://doi.org/10.1524/9783486711875 [2020-06-25]

Hartmann, Christian: Wehrmacht im Ostkrieg: Front und militärisches Hinterland 1941/42, 2nd edition, Munich 2010. URL: https://doi.org/10.1524/9783486702262 [2020-06-25]

Heer, Hannes et al. (eds.): Vernichtungskrieg: Verbrechen der deutschen Wehrmacht 1941–1944, Hamburg 1995.

Heeresgeschichtliches Museum in Wien, Militärwissenschaftliches Institut (ed.): Die K.K. Militärgrenze, Vienna 1977 (Schriften des Heeresgeschichtlichen Museums in Wien 6).

Heuser, Beatrice: Clausewitz lesen! Eine Einführung, Munich 2005 (Militärgeschichte kompakt 1).

Heuser, Beatrice: Den Krieg denken: Die Entwicklung der Strategie seit der Antike, Paderborn et al. 2010. URL: http://mdz-nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:bvb:12-bsb00105108-2 [2020-06-25]

Kieser, Alfred (ed.): Organisationstheorien, 3rd edition, Stuttgart 1999.

Kieser, Alfred: Management und Taylorismus, in: Alfred Kieser (ed.): Organisationstheorien, Stuttgart 1999, pp. 65–99.

Klink, Ernst / Boog, Horst: Die militärische Konzeption des Krieges gegen die Sowjetunion, in: Horst Boog (ed.): Der Angriff auf die Sowjetunion, Stuttgart 1983 (Das Deutsche Reich und der Zweite Weltkrieg 4), pp. 190–326.

Kroener, Bernhard R.: Die personellen Ressourcen des Dritten Reiches im Spannungsfeld zwischen Wehrmacht, Bürokratie und Kriegswirtschaft, 1939–1941, in: Militärgeschichtliches Forschungsamt (ed.): Organisation und Mobilisierung des Deutschen Machtbereichs: Kriegsverwaltung, Wirtschaft und personelle Ressourcen 1939–1941, Stuttgart 1988 (Das Deutsche Reich und der Zweite Weltkrieg 5/1), pp. 693–1016.

Kroener, Bernhard R.: Kriegswesen, Herrschaft und Gesellschaft, 1300–1800, Munich 2013 (Enzyklopädie deutscher Geschichte 92). URL: https://doi.org/10.1524/9783486765403 [2020-06-25]

Kroener, Bernhard R. et al. (eds.): Krieg und Frieden: Militär und Gesellschaft in der frühen Neuzeit, Paderborn et al. 1996.

Kühl, Stefan: Ganz normale Organisationen: Zur Soziologie des Holocaust, Berlin 2014.

Kühl, Stefan: Gesellschaft der Organisationen, organisierte Gesellschaft, Organisationsgesellschaft: Zu den Grenzen einer an Organisationen ansetzenden Zeitdiagnose, in: Maja Apelt et al. (eds.): Zur Zukunft der Organisationssoziologie, Wiesbaden 2015, pp. 73–91. URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-07330-5 [2020-06-25]

Kühl, Stefan: Organisationen: Eine sehr kurze Einführung, Wiesbaden 2011. URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-531-93185-2 [2020-06-25]

Kühne, Thomas / Ziemann, Benjamin: Was ist Militärgeschichte? Paderborn et al. 2000 (Krieg in der Geschichte 6). URL: http://mdz-nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:bvb:12-bsb00045267-8 [2020-06-25]

Kunt, Metin: State and Sultan up to the Age of Süleyman: Frontier Principality to World Empire, in: Metin Kunt et al. (eds.): Süleyman the Magnificent and his Age, London et al. 1995, pp. 3–38.

Lang, Heiner: Condottieri im Italien des 15. und 16. Jahrhunderts: Politik und Ökonomie des Krieges der Republik Florenz zu Beginn der Frühen Neuzeit, in: Stig Förster (ed.): Die Rückkehr der Condottieri? Krieg und Militär zwischen staatlichem Monopol und Privatisierung: von der Antike bis zur Gegenwart, Paderborn et al. 2010 (Krieg in der Geschichte 57), pp. 91–110.

Le Cour Grandmaison, Olivier: Coloniser. Exterminer: Sur la guerre et l'État colonial, Paris 2005.

Lelle, Nikolas: "Firm im Führen": Das "Harzburger Modell" und eine (Nachkriegs)Geschichte deutscher Arbeit, in: Werner Konitzer et al. (eds.): "Arbeit", "Volk", "Gemeinschaft": Ethik und Ethiken im Nationalsozialismus, Frankfurt-on-Main 2016 (Jahrbuch zur Geschichte und Wirkung des Holocaust), pp. 205–224.

Leonhard, Nina / Werkner, Ines-Jacqueline: Militärsoziologie – Eine Einführung, Wiesbaden 2005. URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-531-93456-3 [2020-06-25]

Lieb, Peter: Konventioneller Krieg oder NS-Weltanschauungskrieg? Kriegführung und Partisanenbekämpfung in Frankreich 1943/44, Munich 2007 (Quellen und Darstellungen zur Zeitgeschichte 69). URL: https://doi.org/10.1524/9783486707410 [2020-06-25]

Loquai, Heinz / Schnell, Jürgen: Art. "Militärorganisation", in: Handwörterbuch der Organisation (1980), cols. 1325–1335, here col. 1325 f.

Luhmann, Niklas: Funktionen und Folgen formaler Organisation, 5th edition, Berlin 1999.

Luhmann, Niklas: Organisation und Entscheidung, 3rd edition, Wiesbaden 2011. URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-322-97093-0 [2020-06-25]

Martínez Laínez, Fernando: Como lobos hambrientos: Los guerrilleros en la Guerra de la Independencia (1808–1814), Madrid et al. 2007.

Matuschka, Edgar Graf von: Organisation des Reichsheeres, in Friedrich Forstmeier (ed.): Reichswehr und Republik: 1918–1933, Herrsching 1983 (Deutsche Militärgeschichte in sechs Bänden 1648–1939 3/6), pp. 305–343.

Matuschka, Edgar Graf von: Organisationsgeschichte des Heeres, in Friedrich Forstmeier (ed.): Von der Entlassung Bismarcks bis zum Ende des Ersten Weltkrieges: 1890–1918, Herrsching 1983 (Deutsche Militärgeschichte in sechs Bänden 1648–1939 3/5), pp. 157–282.

Matuschka, Edgar Graf von / Petter, Wolfgang: Organisation der Streitkräfte, in: Friedrich Forstmeier (ed.): Militärgeschichte im 19. Jahrhundert 1814–1890, Herrsching 1983 (Deutsche Militärgeschichte in sechs Bänden 1648–1939 2), pp. 302–358.

Messerschmidt, Manfred: Partisanenkrieg auf dem Balkan: Ziele, Methoden, "Rechtfertigung", in: Manfred Messerschmidt: Militarismus, Vernichtungskrieg, Geschichtspolitik: zur deutschen Militär- und Rechtsgeschichte, Paderborn et al. 2003, pp. 245–265.

Militärgeschichtliches Forschungsamt (ed.): Deutsche Militärgeschichte in sechs Bänden 1648–1939, Lizenzauflage Herrsching 1983.

Moliner Prada, Antonio: El fenómeno guerrillero, in: Antonio Moliner Prada (ed.): La Guerra de la Independencia en España (1808–1814), Madrid 2007, pp. 123–151.

Müller, Christian Th. et al. (eds.): Das ist Militärgeschichte! Probleme – Projekte – Perspektiven, Paderborn et al. 2013. URL: https://doi.org/10.30965/9783657776573 [2020-06-25]

Müller, Rolf-Dieter: Hitlers Wehrmacht 1935–1945, Munich 2012. URL: https://doi.org/10.1524/9783486854701 [2020-06-25]

Müller, Rolf-Dieter et al. (eds.): Die Wehrmacht: Mythos und Realität, Munich 1999. URL: https://doi.org/10.1524/9783486852028 [2020-06-25]

Mueller-Hillebrand, Burkhard: Das Heer 1933–1945, Frankfurt-on-Main 1954–1969, vol. 1–3.

Münkler, Herfried: Die neuen Kriege, 5th edition, Reinbek 2003.

Musial, Bogdan: Sowjetische Partisanen: Mythos und Wirklichkeit 1941–1944, Paderborn 2009. URL: http://mdz-nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:bvb:12-bsb00087466-3 [2020-06-25]

Nafziger, George: Imperial Bayonets: Tactics of the Napoleonic Battery, Battalion and Brigade as found in Contemporary Regulations, London et al. 1996.

Naumann, Klaus: Der blinde Spiegel: Deutschland im afghanischen Transformationskrieg, Hamburg 2013.

Nowosadtko, Jutta: Krieg, Gewalt, Ordnung: Einführung in die Militärgeschichte, Tübingen 2002 (Historische Einführungen 6).

Osterhammel, Jürgen: Die Verwandlung der Welt: Eine Geschichte des 19. Jahrhunderts, 5th edition, Munich 2010.

Papke, Gerhard: Von der Miliz zum Stehenden Heer: Wehrwesen im Absolutismus, Herrsching 1983 (Deutsche Militärgeschichte in sechs Bänden 1648–1939 1/1).

Parker, Geoffrey: The Military Revolution: Military Innovation and the Rise of the West, 1500–1800, 2nd edition, Cambridge 1996.

Parrot, David: The Business of War: Military Enterprise and Military Revolution in Early Modern Europe, Cambridge 2012. URL: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781139023337 [2020-06-25]

Planert, Ute: Einleitung: Krieg und Umbruch um 1800, in: Ute Planert (ed.): Krieg und Umbruch in Mitteleuropa um 1800: Erfahrungsgeschichte(n) auf dem Weg in eine neue Zeit, Paderborn et al. 2009 (Krieg in der Geschichte 44).

Pohl, Dieter: Die Herrschaft der Wehrmacht: Deutsche Militärbesatzung und einheimische Bevölkerung in der Sowjetunion 1941–1944, 2nd editioin, Munich 2009. URL: https://doi.org/10.1524/9783486707397 [2020-06-25]

Pöhlmannn, Markus: Der Panzer und die Mechanisierung des Krieges: Eine deutsche Geschichte 1890 bis 1945, Paderborn 2016 (Zeitalter der Weltkriege 14).

Prietzel, Malte: Kriegführung im Mittelalter: Handlungen, Erinnerungen, Bedeutungen, Paderborn et al. 2006 (Krieg in der Geschichte 32). URL: http://mdz-nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:bvb:12-bsb00052084-2 [2020-06-25]

Pröve, Ralf: Militär, Staat und Gesellschaft im 19. Jahrhundert, Munich 2006 (Enzyklopädie deutscher Geschichte 77). URL: https://doi.org/10.1524/9783486701524 [2020-06-25]

Redlich, Fritz: The German Military Enterpriser and his Work Force: A Study in European Economic and Social History, Wiesbaden 1964/65 (Beiheft zur VSWG 48), vol. 1–2.

Regling, Volkmar: Grundzüge der militärischen Landkriegführung zur Zeit des Absolutismus und im 19. Jahrhundert, in: Friedrich Forstmeier (ed.): Grundzüge der militärischen Landkriegführung, Herrsching 1983 (Deutsche Militärgeschichte in sechs Bänden 1648–1939 6/9), pp. 11–425.

Reichenberger, Florian: Der gedachte Krieg: Vom Wandel der Kriegsbilder in der Bundeswehr im Zeitalter des Ost-West-Konflikts, Munich 2018 (Sicherheitspolitik und Streitkräfte der Bundesrepublik Deutschland 13). URL: https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110465310 [2020-06-25]

Reinhard, Wolfgang: Die Unterwerfung der Welt: Globalgeschichte der europäischen Expansion 1415–2015, Munich 2016. URL: https://doi.org/10.17104/9783406687198 [2020-06-25]

Reuschler, Otto: Die Entwicklung der Heeresorganisation seit Einführung der stehenden Heere, Ulm 1911/1914, vol. 1–2.

Richards, Walter: Her Majesty's Army: Indian and Colonial Forces, London [um 1900], pp. 19–21.

Rink, Martin: Art. "Taktik", in: Enzyklopädie der Neuzeit 13 (2011), cols. 250–255.

Rink, Martin: "Spaniens edles Beispiel" – eine preußische Guerilla? Insurrektionskonzepte 1807–1813, in Birgit Aschmann et al. (eds.): 1813 im europäischen Kontext, Stuttgart 2015 (Historische Mitteilungen: Beiheft 89), pp. 99–122.

Rink, Martin: Das Heer der Bundeswehr im Wandel 1950–2005: Von Himmerod zum Heer der Zukunft, in: Klaus-Jürgen Bremm et al. (eds.): Entschieden für Frieden – 50 Jahre Bundeswehr 1955 bis 2005, Berlin 2005.

Rink, Martin: Effizienz oder Flexibilität? Zugänge zu einer Organisationsgeschichte des deutschen Heeres vor und nach 1990, in: Bernhard Chiari (ed.): Auftrag Auslandseinsatz: Neueste Militärgeschichte an der Schnittstelle von Geschichtswissenschaft, Politik, Öffentlichkeit und Streitkräften, Freiburg et al. 2012 (Neueste Militärgeschichte: Analysen und Studien 1), pp. 125–138.

Rink, Martin: Le royaume de Westphalie et la petite guerre: Insurgés, patriotes, détachements et cosaques 1809–1813, in: Francia: Forschungen zur westeuropäischen Geschichte 42 (2015), pp. 135–160. URL: https://prae.perspectivia.net/publikationen/francia/francia-retro/42-2015/0135-0160 [2020-06-25]

Rink, Martin: Strukturen brausen um die Wette: Zur Organisation des deutschen Heeres, in: Helmut Hammerich et al. (eds.): Das Heer 1950 bis 1970: Konzeption, Organisation, Aufstellung, Munich 2006 (Sicherheitspolitik und Streitkräfte der Bundesrepublik Deutschland 3), pp. 353–483. URL: https://doi.org/10.1524/9783486711875 [2020-06-25]

Rink, Martin: The Partisan's Metamorphosis from Freelance Military Entrepreneur to German Freedom Fighter: 1740–1815, in: War in History 17,1 (2010), p. 6–36.

Rink, Martin: Vom Partheygänger zum Partisanen: Die Konzeption des kleinen Krieges in Preußen 1740–1813, Frankfurt-on-Main et al. 1999 (Europäische Hochschulschriften: Geschichte und ihre Hilfswissenschaften 851).

Rink, Martin: Wilhelm, Count of Schaumburg-Lippe: An "odd" petty prince and a military innovator, in: As linhas defensivas entre o século XVII e Napoleão: The Defensive Lines of the 17th Century to Napoleon, expected Proença-a-Nova 2018 (in preparation).

Roghmann, Klaus / Ziegler, Rolf: Militärsoziologie, in: René König et al. (eds.): Handbuch der empirischen Sozialforschung 9, 2nd edition, Stuttgart 1977, pp. 142–227.

Rothenberg, Gunther E.: Die Österreichische Militärgrenze in Kroatien 1522–1747, Vienna 1970.

Saldern, Adelheid von: Das "Harzburger Modell": Ein Ordnungssystem für bundesrepublikanische Unternehmen, 1960–1975, in: Thomas Etzemüller (ed.): Die Ordnung der Moderne: Social Engineering im 20. Jahrhundert, Bielefeld 2009, pp. 303–329. URL: https://doi.org/10.14361/9783839411537 [2020-06-25]

Scheipers, Sibylle: Unlawful Combatants: A Genealogy of the Irregular Fighter, Oxford 2015. URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199646111.001.0001 [2020-06-25]

Schewe, Gerhard: Art. "Organisation", in: Gabler Wirtschaftslexikon 4 (2014), pp. 2388–2391.

Schmider, Klaus: Partisanenkrieg in Jugoslawien 1941–1944, Hamburg et al. 2002.

Schmidt, Hans: Militärverwaltung in Deutschland und Frankreich im 17. und 18. Jahrhundert, in: Bernhard Kroener et al. (eds.): Krieg und Frieden: Militär und Gesellschaft in der Frühen Neuzeit, Paderborn et al. 2006, pp. 25–46.

Schottelius, Herbert / Caspar, Gustav-Adolf: Die Organisation des Heeres 1933–1939, in: Michael Salewski et al. (eds.): Wehrmacht und Nationalsozialismus 1933–1939, Herrsching 1983 (Deutsche Militärgeschichte in sechs Bänden 1648–1939 4/7), pp. 298–399.

Schreyögg, Georg: Organisation: Grundlagen moderner Organisationsgestaltung, 3rd edition, Wiesbaden 1999. URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-8349-4485-6 [2020-06-25]

Schulte-Zurhausen, Manfred: Organisation, 3rd edition, Munich 2002. URL: https://doi.org/10.15358/9783800646906 [2020-06-25]

Selzer, Stephan: Deutsche Söldner im Italien des Trecento, Tübingen 2001.

Shoji, Junichiro: Die Beziehungen zwischen Politik und Militärwesen im japanischen Modernisierungsprozeß des 19. Jahrhunderts, in: Michael Epkenhans et al. (eds.): Das Militär und der Aufbruch in die Moderne 1860–1890, Munich 2003, pp. 185–198. URL: https://doi.org/10.1524/9783486596267 [2020-06-25]

Sikora, Michael: Die französische Revolution der Heeresverfassung, in: Peter Baumgart et al. (eds.): Die preußische Armee: Zwischen Ancien Régime und Reichsgründung, Paderborn et al. 2008, pp. 135–163. URL: https://doi.org/10.30965/9783657756605 [2020-06-25]

Sikora, Michael: Militarisierung und Zivilisierung: Die preußischen Heeresreformen und ihre Ambivalenzen, in: Peter Baumgart et al. (eds.): Die preußische Armee: Zwischen Ancien Régime und Reichsgründung, Paderborn et al. 2008, pp. 164–195. URL: https://doi.org/10.30965/9783657756605 [2020-06-25]

Stachelbeck, Christian: Deutschlands Heer und Marine im Ersten Weltkrieg, Munich 2013 (Beiträge zur Militärgeschichte 5). URL: https://doi.org/10.1515/9783486854725 [2020-06-25]

Stumpf, Reinhard: Die Luftwaffe als drittes Heer: Die Luftwaffen-Erdkampfverbände und das Problem der Sonderheere 1933 bis 1945, in: Ulrich Engelhardt et al. (eds.): Soziale Bewegung und politische Verfassung: Beiträge zur Geschichte der modernen Welt, Stuttgart 1976, pp. 857–894.

Teixeira, Nuno Severiano et al. (eds.): História Militar de Portugal, Lisbon 2017.

Tessin, Georg (ed.): Verbände und Truppen der deutschen Wehrmacht und Waffen-SS im Zweiten Weltkrieg 1939–1945, vol. 1–17, Osnabrück 1965–2000.

Transfeld, Walter: Wort und Brauch in Heer und Flotte, 9th edition, edited by Hans-Peter Stein, Stuttgart 1986.

Türk, Klaus: "Die Organisation der Welt": Herrschaft durch Organisation in der modernen Gesellschaft, Opladen 1995. URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-322-97058-9 [2020-06-25]

Türk, Klaus / Lemke, Thomas / Bruch, Michael: Organisation in der modernen Gesellschaft: Eine historische Einführung, 2th edition, Wiesbaden 2006. URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-531-90152-7 [2020-06-25]

Umbreit, Hans: Das unbewältigte Problem: Der Partisanenkrieg im Rücken der Ostfront, in: Jürgen Förster (ed.): Stalingrad: Ereignis – Wirkung – Symbol, Munich 1992, pp. 130–150.

Umbreit, Hans: Die deutsche Herrschaft in den besetzten Gebieten 1942–1945, in: Bernhard Kroener (ed.): Organisation und Mobilisierung des deutschen Machtbereichs (Das Deutsche Reich und der Zweite Weltkrieg 5/2), Munich 1999, pp. 3–272.

Uyar, Mesut / Erickson, Edward J.: A Military History of the Ottomans: From Osman to Atatürk, Santa Barbara et al. 2009.

Walter, Dierk: Preußische Heeresreformen 1807–1870: Militärische Innovation und der Mythos der "Roonschen Reform", Paderborn et al. 2003 (Krieg in der Geschichte 16). URL: http://mdz-nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:bvb:12-bsb00045269-4 [2020-06-25]

Wassermann, Felix: Asymmetrische Kriege: Eine politiktheoretische Untersuchung zur Kriegführung im 21. Jahrhundert, Frankfurt-on-Main et al. 2015.

Weber, Max: Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft: Grundriss der verstehenden Soziologie, 5th edition, edited by Johannes Winckelmann, Tübingen 1980.

Wegner, Bernd: Hitlers politische Soldaten: Die Waffen-SS 1933–1945, 5th edition, Paderborn et al. 1997.

Werner, Michael et al. (eds.): Le genre humain: De la comparaison à l'histoire croisée, Paris 2004, pp. 119–137.

Werner, Michael et al. (eds.): Vergleich, Transfer, Verflechtung: Der Ansatz der Histoire croisée und die Herausforderung des Transnationalen, in: Geschichte und Gesellschaft: Zeitschrift für Historische Sozialwissenschaft 28,4 (2002), pp. 607–636. URL: http://resolver.sub.uni-goettingen.de/purl?PPN483856525_0028 [2020-06-25]

Wildt, Michael: Der Fall Reinhard Höhn: Vom Reichssicherheitshauptamt zur Harzburger Akademie, in: Alexander Gallus et al. (eds.): Rückblickend in die Zukunft: Politische Öffentlichkeit und intellektuelle Positionen in Deutschland um 1950 und um 1930, Göttingen 2011, pp. 254–271.

Wilson, Peter H.: Der Dreißigjährige Krieg: Eine europäische Tragödie (Europe's Tragedy: A History of the Thirty Years War), Darmstadt 2017.

Winkel, Carmen: Im Netzwerk des Königs: Netzwerke und Patronage in der preußischen Armee 1713–1786, Paderborn et al. 2013 (Krieg in der Geschichte 79).

Wohlfeil, Rainer: Vom Stehenden Heer des Absolutismus zur Allgemeinen Wehrpflicht, Herrsching 1983 (Deutsche Militärgeschichte in sechs Bänden 1648–1939 1/2).

Xenakis, Stefan: Gewalt und Gemeinschaft: Kriegsknechte um 1500, Paderborn et al. 2015 (Krieg in der Geschichte 90). URL: https://doi.org/10.30965/9783657782307 [2020-06-25]

Zimmermann, Jürg: Militärverwaltung und Heeresaufbringung in Österreich bis 1806, Herrsching 1983 (Deutsche Militärgeschichte in sechs Bänden 1648–1939 1/3).

Notes

1. ^{^} Türk, Die Organisation der Welt 1995, p. 120.
2. ^{^} Türk, Die Organisation der Welt 1995, pp. 44–76; Türk Lemke/Bruch, Organisation 2006, pp. 19–37; Elbe/Peters, Die temporäre Organisation 2016, pp. 4–10. Cf. also Schulte-Zurhausen, Organisation, 2002 pp. 1–6; Schreyögg, Organisation 1999, pp. 4–13.
3. ^{^} Based on Elbe/Peters, Die Temporäre Organisation 2016, pp. 6–8.
4. ^{^} Elbe/Peters, Die temporäre Organisation 2016, pp. 6f.
5. ^{^} Loquai/Schnell, Militärorganisation 1980, cols. 1325f ("Militärorganisation [ist] ein soziotechnisches Subsystem, das ein zugeordnetes Sozialsystem befähigt, bewaffnete Auseinandersetzungen gegen andere Sozialsysteme zu führen"). English transl. by N. Williams.
6. ^{^} Roghmann/Ziegler, Militärsoziologie 1977, p. 142 ("organisierte Anwendung von Gewalt zwischen kriegführenden Parteien"). English transl. by N. Williams.
7. ^{^} Schewe, Organisation 2014, cols. 2388.
8. ^{^} Kühl, Organisationen 2011, pp. 136–157.
9. ^{^} Elbe/Peters, Die Temporäre Organisation 2016.
10. ^{^} Türk, Die Organisation der Welt 1995, p. 13; Bonazzi, Geschichte des organischen Denkens 2014, p. 15.
11. ^{^} Conze/Geyer/Stumpf, Militarismus 1978, p. 7; Corvisier, Armées et sociétés 1976, p. 21; Kroener, Législateur 1996, p. 323.
12. ^{^} Weber, Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft 1980, p. 124 (first quotation), 566 f. (second quotation) ("kontinuierliche[n], regelgebundene[n] Betrieb von Amtsgeschäften" English transl. by N. Williams).
13. ^{^} Kroener, Kriegswesen 2013, p. 1. On the continuities in the time around 1800: Planert, Einleitung: Krieg und Umbruch um 1800 2009, pp. 12–14; Pröve, Militär, Staat und Gesellschaft 2006, pp. 1f.; Sikora, Die französische Revolution 2008, pp. 137–139 ("aus der Geschichte der Geschichtswissenschaft erwachsene willkürliche Grenzziehung" English transl. by N. Williams).
14. ^{^} Kühne, Was ist Militärgeschichte 2000; Echternkamp, Perspektiven 2010; Müller, Das ist Militärgeschichte! 2013.
15. ^{^} Luhmann, Funktionen und Folgen 1964/1999; Luhmann, Organisation und Entscheidung 2000/2011, pp. 25, 447–449; Kühl, Organisationen 2011, pp. 116–136.
16. ^{^} Clausewitz: Vom Kriege 1832/1973, book 1, chapter 2, pp. 214 (Howard/Paret, p. 90), 223–229 (Howard/Paret, p. 95–97), book 2, chapter 1, p. 27;  Howard/Paret, p. 132: "Organisation und Administration der Streitkräfte" English transl. by N. Williams; Howard/Paret, p. 132: "Schaffung, Ausbildung und Erhaltung aller Streitkräfte" (first quotation) English transl. by N. Williams; book 4, chapter 11, pp. 467f. (Howard/Paret, p. 258f.), book 5, chapter 3, p. 504 ("einander an Bewaffnung, Ausrüstung und Übung so ähnlich, dass zwischen den besten und schlechtesten kein sehr merklicher Unterschied … besteht", (second quotation) English transl. by N. Williams; cf. Howard/Paret, p. 282: "Today armies are  so much alike in weapons, training, and equipment, that there is little difference in such matters between the best and the worst of them"). Concerning "annihilation" cf., book 7, chapter 6, pp. 881 "Vernichtung der feindlichen Streitkräfte" as opposed to "destruction of the enemy forces" (Howard/Paret: p. 529); cf. "Vernichtung des Feindes", book 8, chapter 1, p. 949 as opposed to: "destruction of the ennemy" (Howard/Paret: book 8, chapter 1, p. 577) . It should be remarked, hence, that in a German reception "Vernichtung" was tended to be (mis)read as "annihilation", whereas Howard and Paret translated this into the more military-pragmatical "destruction", which was probably more of what Clausewitz meant.
17. ^{^} Clausewitz: Vom Kriege 1832/1973, book 5, chapter 5, p. 523 ("1. Hat ein Ganzes zu wenig Glieder, so wird es ungelenk. 2. Sind die Glieder eines Ganzen zu groß, so schwächt dies die Macht des obersten Willens. 3. Mit jeder neuen Stufenfolge des Befehls wird die Kraft desselben […] geschwächt, einmal durch den Verlust, den sie beim neuen Übergang macht, zweitens durch die längere Zeit, die der Befehl braucht" English transl. by N. Williams) (Howard/Paret: p. 295: "a. The whole will be unwieldly if it has too few subdivisions. b. If the subdivisions are too large, the commander's personal authority will bediminished. c. Every additional link in the chain of command reduces the effect of an order in two ways: by the process of being transferred, and by the additional time needed to pass it on.").
18. ^{^} Clausewitz: Vom Kriege 1832/1973, book 5, chapter 5, p. 521 ("ein Befehlshaber an allen Teilen seines Korps eine Art Eigentumsrecht zu haben glaubt" English transl. by N. Williams) (Howard/Paret: book 8, chapter 1, p. 294: "the subordinate commander thinks he has a kind of proprietary right over every part of his corps"). ß here, "subordinate" is misleading!
19. ^{^} Elbe/Richter, Militär 2005, pp. 136–142. On the three types of legitimate rule, see: Weber, Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft [1920] 1980, p. 124. In relation to this, see: vom Hagen/Tomforde, Militärische Organisationskultur 2005, p. 188; Elbe/Richter, Militär (as above), p. 153.
20. ^{^} Weber, Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft 1980, p. 222.
21. ^{^} Kroener, Kriegswesen 2013, pp. 2–9.
22. ^{^} Black, War in the World 2011; Black, Beyond the Military Revolution 2011; Reinhard, Die Unterwerfung der Welt 2016; Osterhammel, Die Verwandlung der Welt 2009/2010.
23. ^{^} Förster, Die Militarisierung der Steppe 2006.
24. ^{^} Selzer, Deutsche Söldner 2001, pp. 47–95, here in particular pp. 52–54, 64f.
25. ^{^} Lang, Condottieri 2010; Baumann, Die deutschen Condottieri 2010.
26. ^{^} Nowosadko, Krieg, Gewalt, Ordnung 2006, p. 232.
27. ^{^} Contamine, Histoire militaire de la France 1992/1997, pp. 139f., 147f.
28. ^{^} Delbrück, Geschichte der Kriegskunst 1901/2003, pp. 589–591, 598; 1920/2003, pp. 3–27; Militärgeschichtliches Forschungsamt, Deutsche Militärgeschichte 1964–1979/1983; Contamine, Histoire militaire de la France 1992/1997; Severiano Teixeira, História Militar de Portugal 2017, pp. 15–206.
29. ^{^} Kroener, Kriegswesen 2013, pp. 23–27.
30. ^{^} Transfeld, Wort und Brauch 1986, pp. 142–146; Regling, Grundzüge 1979/1983, pp. 31–34; Baumann, Landsknechte 1994, pp. 92–103; Xenakis, Gewalt und Gemeinschaft 2015, pp. 60–70 (quotation on p. 70), pp. 135–140.
31. ^{^} Wilson, Der Dreißigjährige Krieg 2017, pp. 129–133, 187–192; Papke, Von der Miliz zum Stehenden Heer 1979/1983, pp. 27–36.
32. ^{^} Diskussion in: Burkhardt, Der Dreißigjährige Krieg 1992, pp. 214–224; Burkhardt, Der Krieg der Kriege 2018, pp. 131–136; Kroener, Kriegswesen 2013, pp. 36–43, particularly p. 38.
33. ^{^} Schreyögg, Organisation 1999, pp. 82f.; Ebers/Gotsch, Institutionenökonomische Theorien 1999, pp. 209–224; Frese, Grundlagen der Organisation, pp. 315f.
34. ^{^} Schmidt, Militärverwaltung 1996, pp. 28f., 43–45.
35. ^{^} Uyar/Erickson, A Military History of the Ottomans, pp. 4, 12f., 36–38, 44–66, 91–94, 121; Aksan, Ottoman Wars 2007, pp. 48–59; Kunt, State and Sultan 1995.
36. ^{^} Heeresgeschichtliches Museum in Wien, Militärwissenschaftliches Institut, Die K.K. Militärgrenze 1960/1970; Rothenberg, Die Österreichische Militärgrenze 1977; Zimmermann: Militärverwaltung und Heeresaufbringung in Österreich 1965/1983, pp. 28–44.
37. ^{^} Contamine, Histoire militaire de la France, vol. 1 1992/1997, pp. 341, 362–366, 394, 398–400, 406; Delmas, Histoire militaire de la France, vol. 2 1992/1997, pp. 42f.
38. ^{^} Parrot, The Business of War 2012, pp. 102–104, 135, 150, 192–194, 241–279. Generally: Redlich, The German Military Enterpriser 1964/65.
39. ^{^} Winkel, Im Netzwerk 2010.
40. ^{^} Regling, Grundzüge 1979/1983, pp. 34–36.
41. ^{^} Regling, Grundzüge 1979/1983, pp. 148–170; Rink, Taktik 2011.
42. ^{^} Heuser, Den Krieg denken 2010; Sachsen: Mes Rêveries 1732/1757, pp. 46–52; Guibert, Essai Général 1772, vol. 1, pp. 122f.
43. ^{^} Rink, Wilhelm, Count of Schaumburg-Lippe 2018.
44. ^{^} Rink, Vom Partheygänger 1999.
45. ^{^} Scharnhorst, Beweis 1803/1985, pp. 91–96; Guibert, Essai Général 1772, vol. 1, p. 128.
46. ^{^} Türk/Lemke/Bruch, Organisation 2006, pp. 100–113; Elbe/Peters, Die temporäre Organisation 2016, pp. 20–24.
47. ^{^} [Anonymous], Wörterbuch 1799, p. 10, ("Conscription"), 19 ("Organiser"). "ein Land auf französische Art ein[zu]richten" (first quotation), "Schlachtvieh zur Armee treiben" (second quotation) English transl. by N. Williams.
48. ^{^} Delmas, Histoire Militaire de la France, vol. 2 1992/1997, pp. 236–250 (quotation on p. 237), 307f.; Sikora, Die französische Revolution 2008.
49. ^{^} Nafziger, Imperial Bayonets 1996.
50. ^{^} Reuschler, Die Entwicklung der Heeresorganisation 1 1911, pp. 51–61; Regling, Grundzüge 1979/1983, p. 219; Wohlfeil, Vom Stehenden Heer 1964, pp. 154–157; Delmas, Histoire Militaire de la France 1992/1997, pp. 346–350; Nowosadtko, Krieg, Gewalt, Ordnung 2002, pp. 231–240.
51. ^{^} Gill, Thunder on the Danube 2008, pp. 92f, 109–113; [Anonymous], Die Armee des Königreichs Westfalen 1887, pp. 166f.; Rink, Le royaume de Westphalie 2015, pp. 139–141.
52. ^{^} Wohlfeil, Vom Stehenden Heer 1964, pp. 163–169; Sikora, Militarisierung und Zivilisierung 2008.
53. ^{^} Regling, Grundzüge 1983, pp. 216–220; Walter, Preußische Heeresreformen 2003, pp. 483–498.
54. ^{^} Füssel, Händler, Söldner und Sepoys 2011, pp. 309–317 (quotation on p. 317).
55. ^{^} Osterhammel, Die Verwandlung der Welt 2009/2010, pp. 788–792; Reinhard, Die Unterwerfung der Welt 2016, pp. 782–784.
56. ^{^} Richards, Her Majesty's Army 1900, pp. 19–21.
57. ^{^} On organisation: Matuschka/Petter, Organisationsgeschichte der Streitkräfte 1976, pp. 315–319; on time and classification: Foerster, Die Wehrpflicht 1994; Epkenhans, Das Militär und der Aufbruch in die Moderne 2003. In detail: Walter, Preußische Heeresreformen 2003, pp. 371–380, 490–495. On adaptation, for example in Russia: Benecke, Militär, Reform und Gesellschaft 2006, pp. 41–43.
58. ^{^} Reichenberger, Der gedachte Krieg 2018; Groß, Mythos und Wirklichkeit 2012; Heuser, Den Krieg denken 2010.
59. ^{^} Reuschler, Die Entwicklung der Heeresorganisation 1914, pp.52–63. On the German army: Matuschka, Organisation des Reichsheeres 1970/1983; Matuschka, Organisationsgeschichte des Heeres 1968/1983.
60. ^{^} Stachelbeck, Deutschlands Heer und Marine 2013, pp. 105–110.
61. ^{^} Uyar/Erickson, A Military History of the Ottomans 2009, pp. 121–134, 154; Aksan, Ottoman Wars 2007, pp. 185–196, 328–336, 404–416.
62. ^{^} Shoji, Die Beziehungen zwischen Politik und Militärwesen 2003, p. 192.
63. ^{^} Philippe Masson in: Delmas, Histoire militaire de la France 1992/1997, pp. 501–533; Le Cour Grandmaison, Coloniser, Exterminer 2005, p. 189.
64. ^{^} Pfordten, Organisation 1917, p. 9 ("[u]nserem herrlichen deutschen Heere", "einer vorbildlichen Organisation" "einen Zentralbegriff dieses Weltkrieges", English transl. by N. Williams).
65. ^{^} Trotzki, Zur Organisation 1920; also: Türk/Lemke/Bruch, Organisation 2006, p. 247.
66. ^{^} Bonazzi, Geschichte des organischen Denkens 2014, pp. 48f.
67. ^{^} Taylor, Die Grundsätze wissenschaftlicher Betriebsführung 1913; on this: Kieser, Management und Taylorismus 1999; Bonazzi, Geschichte des organischen Denkens 2014, pp. 25–69.
68. ^{^} Baberowski, Verbrannte Erde 2012, p. 101, 136, 174f.
69. ^{^} Briefs, Ueber das Organisationsproblem 1918, pp. 14f ("the prevailing organization psychosis", English transl. by N. Williams).
70. ^{^} Türk, Die Organisation der Welt 1995, pp. 84–92, 95; Elbe/Peters, Die temporäre Organisation 2016, pp. 31f.; Kühl, Gesellschaft der Organisationen 2015.
71. ^{^} Türk, Die Organisation der Welt 1995.
72. ^{^} Arendt, Elemente und Ursprünge 1951/55/2017, pp. 766f ("Menschen so zu organisieren, daß sie sich nach den Gesetzen dieser [ideologisch geformten] fiktiven Wirklichkeit bewegen" English transl. by N. Williams).
73. ^{^} Kühl, Ganz normale Organisationen 2014; Hartmann, Wehrmacht im Ostkrieg 2010.
74. ^{^} On the military build up of the German Wehrmacht: Kroener, Die personellen Ressourcen 1988; Klink/Boog, Die militärische Konzeption 1983, pp. 202–209, 217f., 259–271, 299–314; Güth, Die Organisation der Kriegsmarine 1978/1983; Mueller-Hillebrand, Das Heer 1969, vol. 1–3; Tessin, Verbände und Truppen der deutschen Wehrmacht 1965–2000, vol. 1–17.
75. ^{^} Frieser, Blitzkrieg-Legende 1995, pp. 118–122 (first quotation p. 119, second quotation p. 121).
76. ^{^} The tank divisions each encompassed around 11,000 men and 324 tanks, while the infantry divisions each led over 17,000 men into the field. The battle capacity of the Wehrmacht and Waffen-SS in the years 1943 and 1944 reached a high point of around 9.4 million, with a shocking attrition rate of 26 per cent in the army formations. Kroener, Die personellen Ressourcen 1988, pp. 835, 843, 985f, and the graph in the appendix of the volume; Müller, Hitlers Wehrmacht 1935–1945, Munich 2012, pp. 49–51; Wegner, Hitlers politische Soldaten 1982/1997, pp. 126f., 279, 304–310; generally: Mueller-Hillebrand, Das Heer 1969, vol. 1–3; Tessin, Verbände und Truppen der deutschen Wehrmacht 1965–2000, vol. 1–17.
77. ^{^} Stumpf, Die Luftwaffe als drittes Heer 1976.
78. ^{^} Schottelius/Caspar, Die Organisation des Heeres 1933–1939, pp. 338, 344; Matuschka, Organisation des Reichsheeres, pp. 319f.; Tessin, Verbände und Truppen der deutschen Wehrmacht, p. 43; Greenfield/Palmer/Wiley, Reorganization of Ground Troops for Combat 1947, pp. 273, 300–318; Rink, Strukturen brausen 2006, pp. 367–372, 413–416; Hammerich, et al., Das Heer 2006; Pöhlmannn, Der Panzer und die Mechanisierung des Krieges 2016, pp. 468–474.
79. ^{^} Rink, Strukturen brausen 2006, pp. 435–466.
80. ^{^} Rink, Das Heer der Bundeswehr Wandel 2005.
81. ^{^} The so-called Harzburg model was a model for the early Federal Republic of Germany. This management doctrin heavily influenced by the business consultant Reinhard Höhn (1904–2000) incorporated military command principles. However, its influence decreased from 1970 onward because Höhn's previous role as an SS intellectual attracted increasing criticism. On this: Grunwald/Bernthal, Controversy in German Management 1983; Saldern, Das "Harzburger Modell" 2009; Wildt, Der Fall Reinhard Höhn 2011; Lelle, "Firm im Führen" 2016. Hannah Arendt drew attention to Höhn (though incorrectly referred to him as "Reinhold Hoehn") in the postwar years: Arendt, Elemente und Ursprünge totaler Herrschaft 1951/55/2017, pp. 724, 766, 832, 878.
82. ^{^} Greiner, Macht und Geist im Kalten Krieg 2011.
83. ^{^} Werner, Le genre humain 2004; Werner, Vergleich, Transfer, Verflechtung 2002.
84. ^{^} See the justified criticism in Echternkamp/Martens, Militärgeschichte als Vergleichs- und Verflechtungsgeschichte 2012, p. 9.
85. ^{^} Rink, Vom Partheygänger 1999, pp. 87–146; Rink, The Partisan's Metamorphosis 2010.
86. ^{^} Rink, Spaniens edles Beispiel 2015; Rink, The Partisan's Metamorphosis 2010, p 16 f.
87. ^{^} Fraser, Napoleon's Cursed War 2008, pp. 335–347, pp. 393–397, pp. 497–501; Moliner Prada, El fenómeno guerrillero, pp. 123f.
88. ^{^} Marx, Das revolutionäre Spanien 1854/1961, pp. 462. Cf. Martínez Laínez, Como lobos 2007, pp. 136f., pp. 451–460, pp. 523–538 ("in losen Korps, die stets auf dem Punkt standen, zu Banditen zu werden oder auf das Niveau stehender Regimenter herabzusinken." English transl. by N. Williams).
89. ^{^} Haffner, Der neue Krieg 1966.
90. ^{^} On the connection between partisan conflict and the "war of annihilation" in the Second World War: Heer, Vernich-tungskrieg (in particular the articles by Hannes Heer, pp. 104–156; Truman Anderson, pp. 297–314; Walter Manoschek and Hans Safrian, pp. 359–373). For an earlier discussion of this topic: Umbreit, Das unbewältigte Problem 1992.
91. ^{^} Umbreit, Die deutsche Herrschaft in den besetzten Gebieten 1942–1945 1999, pp. 153–181; Müller, Die Wehrmacht 1999 (in particular the articles by Lutz Klinkhammer, pp. 815–836; Timm C. Richter, pp. 837–857; Klaus Schmider, pp. 901–922); Messerschmidt, Partisanenkrieg auf dem Balkan (originally in 1999) 2003, pp. 245-265; Schmider, Partisanenkrieg in Jugoslawien 1941–1944 2002; Chiari, Die polnische Heimatarmee 2003; Brakel, Unter Rotem Stern und Hakenkreuz: Baranowicze 2009, pp. 279–377; Lieb, Konventioneller Krieg oder Weltanschauungskrieg? 2007, pp. 233–415; Pohl, Die Herrschaft der Wehrmacht 2009, pp. 283–304; Hartmann, Wehrmacht im Ostkrieg 2010, pp. 699–764.
92. ^{^} For example in: Musial, Sowjetische Partisanen 2009, pp. 176–178.
93. ^{^} Naumann, Der blinde Spiegel 2013, pp. 12; Scheipers, Unlawful Combatants 2015, pp. 234.
94. ^{^} First evaluations in: Rink, Effizienz oder Flexibilität 2012.